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Social and political scientists are involved in an extensive but inconclusive debate about the 
role of international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in European migration 
governance. The European Union (EU) and NGOs work under the assumption that NGOs are 
crucial to migration governance and yet the role of NGOs is not clear. The EU has invested 
time and money in its attempts to involve NGOs more actively in migration governance, but it 
does so without much knowledge of how NGOS in the past have influenced migration 
governance, and thus with no idea if the current investments are worthwhile. In this article, 
which is the introduction to the special issue on this subject, we take a closer look at the NGOs 
involved in West European migration in the period from the 1860s until the present day in order 
to understand the changing role of NGOs in migration governance in Europe. Providing moral, 
logistical and expert authority in a purportedly impartial way, NGOs have added a dimension 
to migration governance that states cannot replicate. As a result, the number of NGOs has 
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gradually increased and at times their influence has become significant. However, in providing 
a chronology of the involvement of NGOs in migration governance, we show that their 
influence migration governance policies and practices has not been linear. During some 
windows of opportunity (e.g. in the immediate years following the First and Second World 
Wars and the Cold War), NGOs became more prominent and effective, while at other times 
(e.g. the 1930s), their importance waned. The presence and capacity of NGOs to contribute to 
migration governance depended on whether states, and increasingly after 1945, 
intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, needed them to further their own interests or 
to fulfil a role that they could not play.  
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Introduction 
This special issue is the result of an interdisciplinary conference at which experts discussed the 
significance, position, and contribution of non-state actors to migration governance.1 In the late 
1990s, dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of regime theory and its rationalist origins 
led to the introduction of the broader concept of migration management, and an interest in 
politics beyond the state.2 More recently, management was replaced by governance to include 
civil society (of which NGOs – nongovernmental organisations – are part), hoping that this 
would help change migration into an orderly and predictable phenomenon.3 Governance is 
defined as the processes of governing by governments and other organisations (including 
NGOs, and firms), through laws, norms, and discourse.4 It refers to the process of interaction 
                                               
1 In 2016 at Leiden University. 
2 A. Betts (eds), Global migration governance (Oxford 2011).  
3 F. Crépeau and I. Atak ‘Global migration governance avoiding commitments on human rights, yet tracing a 
course for cooperation’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 34:2 (2016) 113-146. 
4 B. Gosh (ed), Managing migration: Time for a new international regime? (Oxford 2000); D. Lewis and P. 
Opoku-Mensah, ‘Policy arena moving forward research agendas on international NGOs: theory, agency and 
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and decision-making among actors.5 The conference, tapping into this debate, showed that there 
was a lack of historical and empirical work on NGOs, which this special issue attempts to fill. 
In the sections below, the articles of this special issue are put into the context of the broader 
debate. We aim to historicise the field of migration governance, investigate the effectiveness of 
NGOs, and their relation to IGOs (inter-governmental organisations) and the state. Although 
the articles in this issue underline our aim to historicise, they do show an imbalance because 
they focus on Western Europe, and do not cover the period from the 1970s to the 1990s 
(although this introduction does include these decades). We hope future studies will remedy 
that. The articles in this issue are about the role of NGOs. NGOs can have influence on policies 
and their implementation because they claim to represent the migrants they work for. However, 
most of the people working for NGOs are not migrants, and analysing the role of NGOs is not 
the same as studying the voice of the immigrants. Exploring migrant experiences of NGOs is a 
related but separate issue.  
 In this article and special issue, we look at how, when and why the role of NGOs in 
migration governance in Europe changed. There is a large number of publications that define 
NGOs, and they introduce a myriad of sub-labels and different typologies of NGOs.6 NGOs are 
defined here as organisations that are not established by a government or by intergovernmental 
agreement. This broad definition includes non-state actors that are not included in this issue 
such as multinational corporations, schools and universities, political parties, churches, rebel 
groups, trade unions and sports clubs. We included in this introduction NGOs that work in the 
field of migration, and which seek to promote specific goals (such as migrant protection) or to 
                                               
context’, Journal of International Development 18 (2006) 665–675; M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, ‘The new politics 
of international mobility: Migration management and its discontents’, IMIS Beiträge 40 (2012) 11-24; M. Czaika 
and H. de Haas, ‘The effectiveness of immigration policies’, Population and Development Review 39:3 (2013) 
487–508; A. Betts, ‘The global governance of crisis migration’, FMR 45 (2014) 76-79; M. Geiger and A. Pécoud, 
‘International organisations and the politics of migration’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40:6 (2016) 
865-887. 
5 M. Bevir, Governance: A very short introduction (Oxford 2013).  
6 D. Hilhorst, The real world of NGOs: Discourses, diversity and development (London 2003). 
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influence policies (for instance liberalising migration restrictions).  
In this article, we use the term NGO for the whole period under study, although the term 
was only coined in 1945, with the creation of the United Nations (UN). The UN granted selected 
international NGOs observer status at its assemblies and meetings, as the League of Nations 
(LoN 1920-1946) had done for NGOs, which were at that time called private relief or voluntary 
organisations. Later, the term NGO acquired a broader meaning and included also organisations 
that did not have observer status. IGOs are organisations established by official treaties to work 
on areas that several states have a shared interest in tackling. 
There are millions of NGOs worldwide, most of which operate at the local or national 
level. The current edition of the Yearbook of International Organizations, which lists NGOs 
that operate internationally, contains over 75,000 entries on international NGOs and IGOs (half 
of these are active, the rest are dormant).7 Migrants in this issue refers to all categories of 
migrants, including refugees. Policy makers, as a rule, distinguish between four major 
categories of migrants: refugees, labour migrants, family migrants and colonial migrants.8 This 
categorisation is related to laws and regulations (e.g. in the case of refugees to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention). The literature frequently focusses one category only (mostly refugees), but NGOs 
and IGOs were and are simultaneously active on behalf of migrants in all four categories.9 In 
addition NGOs spend a lot of time and money on, and have derived much of their authority 
from activities that cut across the four categories: saving children, fighting the trafficking of 
women, or protesting statelessness. It is rather common – for policy makers and the people 
involved – to make a distinction between refugees and other migrants. This dates back to well 
                                               
7 Published since 1910 and now online http://www.uia.org/yearbook; 
http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-HOME.HTM 
8 M. Schrover, ‘Labour migration’, in: M. van der Linden and K. Hofmeester (eds), Handbook Global History of 
Work (Oldenbourg 2017) 443-478. 
9 P. Gatrell, ‘The World Wide Web of Humanitarianism, NGOs and population displacement in the third quarter 
of the twentieth century’, European Review of History 23:1-2 (2016) 101-115. 
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before the introduction of the 1951 Refugees Convention, as Shaw shows.10 Refugees were and 
are perceived as different from other migrants because they are seen as deserving support, and 
states that provide this support claim to be democratic, civilised and humane. In practice, 
however, the lines between the categories were and are not always so sharp, as has been 
recognised in recent debates scrutinising the artificial boundaries between categories.11  
This introduction provides a helicopter view of the history of NGO activity in West-
European migration governance in the period from the 1860s until the present day in all four 
policy domains, as well as those cutting across domains. We argue that the changing role of 
NGOs can only be explained if the activities of NGOs are studied alongside and in interaction 
with the actions of IGOs. We focus on Western Europe because that is the home-base of some 
of the largest and oldest NGOs, although they were also active outside Europe.12 The focus on 
Europe is also explained by current debates on the role of NGOs in European migration 
governance.13 The European Union (EU), other IGOs, national states, and NGOs are convinced 
that NGOs do, can and should play a role in migration governance. The EU and UN increasingly 
involve NGOs in policy making and implementation, although the academic debate on the role 
of NGOs in migration governance is inconclusive.14  
The interaction between states and NGOs works in two ways. On the one hand, NGOs 
and IGOs depend on states for financial support, and for the ratification and implementation of 
                                               
10 C. Shaw, Britannia’s embrace: Modern humanitarianism and the imperial origins of refugee relief (Oxford and 
New York 2015). 
11 UNHCR, Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: a 10-Point Plan of Action, January 2007, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/migration/4742a30b4/refugee-protection-mixed-migration-10-point-planaction. 
Html; H. Crawley and D. Skleparis, ‘Refugees, migrants, neither, both: categorical fetishism and the politics of 
bounding in Europe’s “migration crisis”’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44:1 (2018) 48-64. 
12 T. Davies, NGOs: A new history of transnational civil society (Oxford 2013); F. Käser, ‘A civilized nation: 
Japan and the Red Cross 1877–1900’, European Review of History 23: 1-2 (2016) 16-32; K. O'Sullivan, M. Hilton, 
and J. Fiori, ‘Humanitarianisms in context’, European Review of History 23 1-2 (2016) 1-15. 
13 B. Kohler-Koch, ‘The three worlds of European civil society. What role for civil society for what kind of 
Europe?’, Policy and Society 28 (2009) 47-57. 
14 Gosh (ed.), Managing migration; Geiger and Pécoud, ‘The new politics of international mobility’; Czaika and 
De Haas, ‘The effectiveness of immigration policies’. 
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treaties.15 Since NGOs also sometimes campaign against state policies this dependency is to 
some degree paradoxical.16 On the other hand, states need organisations to do what they cannot 
do themselves.17 Part of the literature on global governance assumes that the power of NGOs 
has increased at the expense of state sovereignty. However, other scholars argue that the 
interaction should not be treated in terms of opposites: states provide funding to NGOs, and 
they leave space for NGOs to operate.18 This makes the interactions more dependent than 
discordant.19  
The position states take differs per country. In Sweden, for instance – as Frohnert shows 
in this issue – the state excluded NGOs from assisting migrants from 1945 to the early 1990s. 
In the 1990s, the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers from (former) Yugoslavia caused 
the Swedish state to seek assistance from NGOs. In southern European countries, by contrast, 
the state has continuously turned to NGOs for help with migration governance.20 In recent 
years, the EU has relied heavily upon NGOs for the implementation of policies in the newer 
member states in part because it lacks the instruments to enforce policies without this 
assistance.21 
                                               
15 A. Florini, Third force: the rise of transnational civil society (Washington 2000); S. Khagram, J.V. Riker and 
K. Sikkink, ‘From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational advocacy groups restructuring world politics’, in: S. 
Khagram, J.V. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds) Restructuring world politics: Transnational social movements, 
networks, and norms (Minnesota 2002) 3-23; Geiger and Pécoud, ‘International organisations’. 
16 M. Hilton, J. McKay, N. Crowson and J-F. Mouhot, The Politics of expertise. How NGOs shaped modern 
Britain (Oxford 2013).  
17 N. Nikolova, ‘Immigration and refugee policies of Bulgaria as part of the accession process to the EU’, Der 
Donauraum 49:1-2 (2009) 33-43; K. O'Sullivan, ‘Humanitarian encounters: Biafra, NGOs and imaginings of the 
Third World in Britain and Ireland, 1967–70’, Journal of Genocide Research 16:2-3 (2014) 299-315. 
18 O.J. Sending and I.B. Neumann, ‘Governance to governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, states and power’, 
International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006) 651-672. 
19 G. Mann, From empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The road to non-governmentality (Cambridge 
2015).  
20 M. Albahari, Crimes of peace: Mediterranean migrations at the world's deadliest border (Philadelphia 2015). 
21 A. Warleigh, ‘“Europeanizing” civil society: NGOs as agents of political socialization’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 39:4 (2001) 619-639; I. Sudbery, ‘Bridging the legitimacy gap in the EU: can civil society help to 
bring the Union closer to its citizens?’, Collegium 26 (2003) 75-95; I. Bache and S. George, Politics in the 
European Union (Oxford 2006); Geiger and Pecoud, The new politics of international mobility; Betts, ‘The global 
governance’; K. O’Sullivan, ‘A “Global nervous system”: The rise and rise of European Humanitarian NGOs, 
1945-1985’, in: M. Frey, S. Kunkel and C. Unger (eds), International organizations and development, 1945-1990 
(Basingstoke 2014) 196-219.  
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NGOs, in our view, have three types of authority, which enable them to play a role in 
shaping policies and determining practices: expert authority, moral authority, and logistical 
authority.22 NGOs have expert authority when they know the rules and laws, and have access 
to statistics (e.g. number of refugees). NGOs have moral authority when they can claim the 
moral high ground (by fighting discrimination, protecting women and children, or claiming 
neutrality). NGOs have logistical authority when they, for instance, have proven that they can 
organise emergency relief (fast) or mobilise people. We argue that these types of authority 
(expert, moral, and logistical) are policy-domain specific, and depend on the size, age and status 
of the NGOs. At one end of the scale are large and established organisations which not only 
deal with migrant issues, but are also, for instance, anti-poverty or development aid 
organisations. They, as a rule, have all three types of authority. At the other end of the scale are 
small NGOs which have developed a particular niche within migration policy and which have 
one type of authority only. Vermeulen and Gnes in this issue connect authority to legitimacy 
and argue that it is crucial to understand the relationship between organisations and the 
environment in which they operate. Their article answers the important question: why do some 
organisations adapt, change goals, and branch out while others do not? 
We define NGOs as having (measurable) influence on migration governance when they 
are given a role in negotiations (as part of committees, delegations and advisory groups), 
provide advice, co-draft treaties, and when others use their contacts, networks, statistics and 
expertise.23 Their influence becomes apparent when their ideas, concepts and proposals are 
incorporated into conventions and guidelines, when their claims, arguments, strategies and 
examples are adopted and reproduced by others, and when their proposals are translated into 
                                               
22 M. Weber, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology (Berkeley 1978); M. Barnett and R. 
Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’, International Organization 59:1 (2005) 39-75; M. Barnett and T.G. 
Weiss, Humanitarianism in question: Politics, power, ethics (Cornell 2008) 38; E.M. Uçarer, ‘Tempering the EU? 
NGO advocacy in the area of freedom, security, and justice’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27:1 
(2014) 127-146. 
23 S. Ahmed and D.M. Potter, NGOs in international politics (Colorado 2013). 
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the practice of law.24 Since profit making is not the primary goal of NGOs, financial gains are 
not an indicator, although the amount of money that NGOs attract over time provides an 
indication of their sustainability.25 NGOs exert influence when they organise social and political 
arrangements: educating the public, empowering people, constructing networks and monitoring 
agreements.26 Even weak or non-ratified treaties that NGOs contribute to can become 
influential if they launch ideas that later become important.27  
 
State of the art 
Part of the literature on NGOs is descriptive, has strong moral overtones, is a-historical and 
policy driven.28 In the last 15 years, research on the history of humanitarianism has increased.29 
However, most of that literature is not about non-state actors.30 There are exception such as for 
instance Davies with his long history of transnational civil society, of which NGOs are part.31 
Similarly, O’Sullivan, Hilton and Fiori recently bucked the trend by describing the global rise 
of non-state humanitarianism over the last 150 years.32 Also the literature on the history of 
                                               
24 Florini, Third Force; C. Kaunert, S. Léonard and U. Hoffmann, ‘Venue-shopping and the role of Non-
Governmental Organisations in the development of the European Union asylum policy’, Comparative Migration 
Studies 1:1 (2013) 179-200; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, Restructuring world politics. 
25 M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds), Beyond the magic bullet: NGO performance and accountability in the post 
Cold-War world (London 1995). 
26 T. Risse-Kappen, ‘“Let’s argue!”: Communicative action in world politics,’ International Organization 54:1 
(2000) 1-39. 
27 R.M. Price, ‘Transnational civil society and advocacy in world politics’, World Politics 55:4 (2003) 579-606. 
See also S. Heim, ‘International refugee policy and Jewish immigration under the shadow of National Socialism’, 
in: F. Caestecker and B. Moore (eds), Refugees from Nazi Germany and the liberal European states (Oxford 2010) 
17-47. 
28 Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, ‘Policy arena moving forward research agendas’; Crépeau and Atak ‘Global 
migration governance’. 
29 B. Taithe and J. Borton, ‘History, memory and “lessons learnt” for humanitarian practitioners’, European Review 
of History 23: 1-2 (2016) 210-224; J. Paulmann, ‘Conjunctures in the history of international humanitarian aid 
during the twentieth century’, Humanity: A Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development 4:2 
(2013) 215-238.  
30 C. Lancaster, Foreign aid, diplomacy, development, domestic policies (London 2007); T.B. Olesen, H.O. Pharo, 
and K. Paaskesen (eds), Saints and sinners: Official development assistance and its dynamics in a historical and 
comparative perspective (Oslo 2013). 
31 Davies, NGOs. 
32 O’Sullivan, Hilton and Fiori, ‘Humanitarianisms in context’, 2. 
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refugee migration does pay attention to states, international organisations, and NGOs, and there 
are some valuable historical studies on specific NGOs.33  
Several authors have described the waxing and waning of NGOs and their activities 
over time.34 Authors have also tried to identify key moments of change. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 is seen as key, but in practice human rights were rarely 
referenced until decolonisation took place. According to Epp, a rights revolution occurred in 
the 1970s, which resulted in an increase in the number of NGOs.35 Moyn notes that international 
lawyers began to embrace human rights in the 1970s as ‘a morally attractive mechanism for 
social change’.36 In addition, Bradley argues that a range of non-state actors including lawyers, 
filmmakers, statisticians, grassroots activists and NGOs like Amnesty International made 
human rights part of the public and political discourse. However, the development of human 
rights is in no way a linear narrative, but is instead ‘messy and complex.’37 Davies, who has 
analysed the full span of global civil society organisations of which humanitarian NGOs are 
part, counters the idea of linear growth, and the premise of a present day transnational civil 
society of unprecedented scale and significance by presenting a long history of NGOs’ 
influence. According to Davies, NGOs have had a substantial impact on major developments 
in world politics in the last two centuries. The development of transnational civil society was 
cyclical, with peaks in activity in the first decade of the twentieth century, in the early 1930s, 
                                               
33 M.R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European refugees in the twentieth century (Oxford 1985); C. Moorehead, 
Dunant's dream: War, Switzerland and the history of the Red Cross (London 1998); G. Loescher, The UNHCR 
and world politics: A perilous path (Oxford 2001); P. Gatrell, The making of the modern refugee (Oxford 2013); 
P. Orchard, A right to flee: Refugees, states, and the construction of international cooperation (Cambridge 2014). 
On specific organisations see: L. Venturas, et al (ed), International ‘migration management’ in the Early Cold 
War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (Peloponnese 2015); F. Kind-Kovács, ‘The Great 
War, the child’s body and the American Red Cross’, European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire 
23:1-2 (2016) 33-62. 
34 M. Mazower, ‘The end of civilization and the rise of human rights: The mid-twentieth-century disjuncture’, in: 
S. Hoffmann (ed), Human rights in the twentieth century (Human Rights in History) (Cambridge 2010) 29-44; 
Akira Iriye, Global community. The role of international organizations in the making of the contemporary world 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 2002). 
35 C. Epp, The rights revolution (London 1998); Hoffmann (ed), Human rights in the twentieth century. 
36 S. Moyn, The last Utopia (Cambridge, Mass 2010) 179. 
37 M.P. Bradley, The world reimagined (New York 2016) 125. 
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and in the late 1990s. In each of these periods, NGOs formed coalitions around major issues, 
which in all three cases were followed by periods of contraction and fragmentation.38   
O’Sullivan, Hilton and Fiori identified five key phases of NGO expansion: 1. The 
intersection of imperial humanitarianism and internationalism in the late nineteenth century; 2. 
The post-First World War period; 3. The 1940s; 4. The ‘NGO moment’ (1968-1985) when the 
rise of global media and crises in the decolonised world led to the creation of a global 
development industry; and 5. The post-Cold War period.39 Our chronology, presented below, 
is in line with that of previous authors. We, however, do not merely focus on moments of 
expansion but provide a more general narrative that includes moments of expansion and 
stagnation, and influence and impotence for NGOs. We also distinguish five periods: 1. The 
first rights revolution: 1860s to mid-1920s; 2. Exclusion (and thus an insignificant role for 
NGOs): mid-1920s to mid-1940s; 3. Inclusion: late 1940s to 1950s; 4. Expansion: 1960s to 
1980s; and 5. Europeanisation in Post-Cold War Europe: 1990s to present. What distinguishes 
our periodisation from that of others is that we interweave the history of humanitarianism with 
the history of migration governance. While the former has received some attention, the latter is 
still very much under development since most scholars working on migration governance focus 
on contemporary issues rather than on what happened in the past.  
The role of NGOs depended on the requirements, structure and activities of states and, 
after 1945, IGOs. When states lacked expert and logistical authority, they called on NGOs for 
support. The consequence of including NGOs, however, was that NGOs attempted to introduce 
a form of moral authority that challenged states’ moral authority. This meant that when states 
had little or no need for NGOs, they often side-lined them – by reducing financial assistance 
and excluding or delegitimising them at official fora. IGOs also used similar methods at times 
as their power increased. IGOs and NGOs were dependent on each other, but also competed 
                                               
38 Davies, NGOs.  
39 O’Sullivan, Hilton and Fiori, ‘Humanitarianisms in context’, 7. 
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with each other. The blurring of lines between NGO and IGO work, representation and 
organisation, resulted in some NGOs being absorbed into the government system. Gatrell, in 
this issue, tackles the reliance of NGOs on states and IGOs in considerable depth. 
 
The First Rights Revolution:1860s-mid 1920s 
As the nineteenth century advanced, more and more voluntary organisations formed. Drawing 
on ideals developed during the Enlightenment and the Christian Reform Movement, these 
organisations began to fight against slavery, trafficking, prostitution, child labour, and 
alcoholism, to garner charity for the poor and to seek social rights for workers.40 In 1863, Henri 
Dunant founded one of the most famous NGOs of all, the Red Cross, which derived moral 
authority from its neutrality claim. In 1873, lawyers set up an international body, the Insitut de 
Droit International (IDI), which tried to mediate in issues where a lack of harmonisation in 
laws at the European level led to problems. It was the first attempt to harmonise European 
policies on migration-related issues.41 Migration governance in the nineteenth century was very 
much the playing field of lawyers and organisations derived their influence from demonstrating 
expert authority.42 
Trafficking was one of the most vibrant fields of migration governance in this first 
period. In the nineteenth century, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and France were 
at the forefront of drafting international treaties against trafficking in women. Numerous 
conferences were held and campaigners travelled extensively between countries. The number 
of newspaper articles that were published on the subject is extraordinary.43 It was an issue that 
enabled NGOs to gain high visibility and make strong moral claims. NGOs reproduced the 
                                               
40 Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism in question, 18. 
41 P. Rygiel, ‘Does international law matter? The Institut de Droit International and the regulation of migrations 
before the First World War’, Journal of Migration History 1:1 (2015) 7-31. 
42 M. Schrover, ‘Dutch migration research: looking back and moving forward’, TSEG 11: 2 (2014) 199-218. 
43 M. Schrover, ‘History of slavery, human smuggling and trafficking 1860-2010’, in: G. Bruinsma (ed), Histories 
of transnational crime (Amsterdam 2015) 41-70. 
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arguments and strategies from the slavery abolition movement and made use of the new 
medium of motion pictures. Between 1902 and 1919, several conventions were concluded, 
which in practice were however ineffective.44 The conferences, nevertheless, were venues 
where NGO representatives met, and where strategies were developed and dispersed.  
At the end of the nineteenth century, national (frequently church-based) NGOs actively 
encouraged emigration from Europe.45 In 1906, the International Congress on Unemployment 
was held. Labour bureaus, international trade unions and NGOs drafted a proposal for 
international labour exchanges, in the hope of increasing labour emigration, but no country 
signed it.46 The ILO (International Labour Organization, est. 1919) took the lead in organising 
labour migration after the First World War, but also to little effect. Shipping companies were 
more effective in their campaigns against restriction and they used American NGOs promoting 
migrants’ rights to their advantage.47 The shipping companies did what neither NGOs nor state 
authorities could do. The role of these shipping companies in the interwar period is discussed 
by Feys in this issue. His article highlights the role of business in migration governance. Feys 
discusses how NGOs competed at times with shipping companies but also complemented them 
at other junctures depending on the circumstances. Both used logistical and expert knowledge, 
in order to gain authority in their attempts to change refugee policies.  
The famine in Russia led to the creation of Save the Children (est. 1919), which later 
became an active claim maker in migration issues.48 It raised over a million pounds within a 
year for child refugees, branched out to other countries and gained support from Pope Benedict 
                                               
44 M. Lehti and K. Aromaa, ‘Trafficking for sexual exploitation’, Crime & Justice 34 (2006) 133-227; J.R. Pliley, 
‘Claims to protection: the rise and fall of feminist abolitionism in the league of nations' committee on the traffic 
in women and children, 1919-1936’, Journal of Women's History 22:4 (2010) 90-113. 
45 M. Schrover and M. van Faassen, ‘Invisibility and selectivity. Introduction to the special issue on Dutch overseas 
migration in the nineteenth and twentieth century’, TSEG 7:2 (2010) 3-31. 
46 S. Charnovitz, ‘Two centuries of participation: NHOs and international governance’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law 18:183 (1996-1997) 184-286. 
47 Charnovitz, ‘Two centuries of participation’, 184-286. 
48 T. Sasson ‘From Empire to humanity: The Russian famine and the imperial origins of international 
humanitarianism’, Journal of British Studies 55 (July 2016) 519-537. 
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XV and the Red Cross. In 1921, the League of Nations (LoN) called Save the Children its 
pioneer. Like the Red Cross before it, Save the Children gained moral authority because of its 
references to innocent victims and neutrality.49 
During the First World War, 20 million people became refugees and internally displaced 
persons in Europe. This led to the demise of ‘adhocracy’ amongst NGOs and the move towards 
a more organised response to crisis.50 Government budgetary constraints and the number of 
refugees allowed NGOs to raise their profile.51 According to Cabanes a ‘transnationalisation of 
humanitarianism’ took place because of globalisation and the inability of states to cope with 
the enormous humanitarian fallout from the First World War.52 This unification of resources 
became particularly evident in NGOs’ response to the crisis caused by the migration of Russian 
refugees in the 1920s.  
During and after the First World War, 1 million Russians fled53 and most were deprived 
of their citizenship by Soviet authorities. Following a meeting of NGOs concerned with Russian 
refugees in 1921, the Red Cross demanded, on behalf of all NGOs, more support from the 
recently established LoN. Gustave Ador, the President of the Red Cross, suggested the 
‘appointment of a LoN Commissioner for the Russian refugees’. According to Ador this was 
‘not so much a humanitarian duty which calls for the generous activities of the League of 
Nations as an obligation of international justice’.54 The LoN named Fridtjof Nansen as the first 
High Commissioner for Russian Refugees in 1921. Nansen was a highly popular sportsman, 
explorer and war hero. When governments unanimously approved Nansen’s September 1921 
resolution to ‘obtain the collaboration of private relief organisations which hitherto have 
                                               
49 A. Nehlin, Exporting visions and saving children – the Swedish Save the children Fund, Linköping Studies in 
Arts and Science No. 494 (Linköping 2009). 
50 J. Lissner, The politics of altruism (Geneva 1977). 
51 P. Gatrell, The making of the modern refugee (Oxford 2013) 20. 
52 B. Cabanes, The Great War and the origins of humanitarianism, 1918–1924 (Cambridge 2014). 
53 J.H. Simpson, The refugee problem. Report of a survey (London 1939) 62. 
54 Letter from Gustave Ador to the League of Nations, 20 Feb 1921. Published in the League of Nations, Official 
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contributed to the relief work in connection with Russian refugees’ and ‘to associate them 
directly with his work’, it symbolised the vital role NGOs played in the early 1920s.55 Nansen’s 
office received funds raised by NGOs (the office’s budget was tiny) and NGOs could ask the 
LoN to help them circumvent national bureaucratic difficulties. An Advisory Committee of 
Private Organisations met regularly with the High Commissioner. Responding to the lobby by 
NGOs (including the IDI), Nansen introduced what became known as the Nansen Passport: it 
gave stateless Russians identity papers which enabled them to travel to find relatives or work 
for a twelve-month period. The Nansen Passport relieved places such as Constantinople, where 
many refugees were marooned and living in dire conditions.  
At more or less the same time, hundreds of thousands of children from Austria-Hungary, 
Russia and Germany were transferred to Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
the Nordic countries under the supervision of the Red Cross, Caritas (est. 1863) and Save the 
Children. It was meant to be a temporary migration, but it led to permanent adoption in about 
half the cases. NGOs started to push for the harmonisation of laws on adoption.56 A steadfast 
belief in the ability to manage migration – which characterised this period – also led to the 1923 
Population Exchange between Turkey and Greece. It was designed and supervised by Nansen 
and commissioned by the LoN. For the Population Exchange, which affected more than two 
million people, Nansen recruited the help of NGOs such as the Red Cross and Near East Relief 
(NER est. 1915).57 According to Rodogno and Piana, the Red Cross and other NGOs focused 
on ‘scientific administration of relief’ which was in reality biased, selective and semi-colonial.58  
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Overall, in this long first period NGOs proved markedly influential. They cooperated in 
presenting their ideas to policy makers and IGOs; a strategy which worked well. NGOs caught 
and held the attention of the public with highly innovative campaigns. The Red Cross, the anti-
trafficking organisations, and Save the Children possessed strong moral and expert authority. 
IGOs, such as ILO and IDI, mostly had expert authority. Organisations such as the NER and 
Red Cross had logistical authority, although the shipping companies outdid them when it came 
to migration governance because of their resources and experience. States required national and 
transnational assistance from non-state actors to help countries recover after the war. The large 
number of refugees was presented as proof of the failure of new states – Turkey and the Soviet 
Union – in the eyes of their opponents. Political changes and the balance of power were 
instrumental to the effectiveness of NGOs.  
 
Exclusion: mid 1920s-mid 1940s 
By the mid-1920s, most European states had recovered from the war and looked to the future. 
States reasserted their dominance and had less need of NGOs. During the 1930s, economic 
depression and growing nationalism meant that defending migrants’ rights became more 
difficult. It affected NGOs’ room to manoeuvre. Problems in Poland, Fascism in Italy, Nazism 
in Germany, and the Civil War in Spain drove out large numbers of people. Devastating 
unemployment and growing tension meant these people generally faced a hostile reception 
despite the efforts of NGOs to stand up for migrants and refugees.  
In 1925, the High Commissioner for Refugees transferred the task of finding work for 
refugees to the ILO. In 1924, the Comité International des Organisations Privées pour la 
Protection des Migrants (CIOPPM) was created, encouraged by the Jewish Colonization 
Association and supported by the ILO. In the first few months of 1924, 60 NGOs joined the 
CIOPPM. Its headquarters were in Geneva to allow close cooperation with the ILO. The 
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CIOPPM campaigned for transport costs to be fixed before departure, reduction of waiting 
times at stations, and help for migrants with visa applications. In 1928, the Second International 
Emigration and Immigration Conference was held in Havana, with experts from 64 countries. 
With three of the most important immigrant receiving countries absent – Canada, Brazil and 
the US – and disagreement about goals among the participants, this conference had little 
effect.59  
NGOs pushed for a draft convention on the rights of Russian and Armenian refugees 
from the late 1920s onwards.60 NGOs pressed the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
for the LoN to summon states together in 1933. The 1933 Convention Relating to the 
International Status of Refugees contained a number of significant recommendations relating 
to labour conditions, industrial accidents, and welfare and education. Yet only eight countries 
ratified the convention – and only then with varying reservations.61 In 1933, the LoN appointed 
an autonomous High Commissioner responsible for German refugees, the American James 
MacDonald. The new office had to appropriate funds privately to appease Germany’s 
objections to the LoN.62 McDonald resigned from his post after two years, and blamed the 
growing crisis facing Jewish and non-Jewish refugees on the intransigence of the international 
community. The LoN sought to reform itself and tried to involve civil society to a greater extent. 
The attempt failed but the ideas that were floated were used by the UN in the post-war period.63  
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In July 1938, 29 governments met in Evian to discuss the situation of refugees escaping 
from Nazism. The US did not send a delegate to Evian, did not increase quotas, and accepted 
only very few Jewish refugees. Other countries similarly took few or no refugees. The number 
of German Jewish refugees, whose fate was discussed at Evian, was 225,000 – much fewer than 
the number of Russian refugees twenty years earlier. Thirty-nine NGOs, including 21 Jewish 
organisations, attended the conference. They did so in an unofficial capacity, even though the 
conference maintained that refugee welfare would remain the responsibility of voluntary 
organisations rather than states. The Evian conference’s negligible recommendations – the 
creation of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, which lingered in obscurity from 
October 1939 until 1943 – demonstrated the ineffectiveness of NGOs.64 
The economic depression of the 1930s resulted in xenophobic attitudes and restrictive 
migration regimes. The absence of cooperation with the LoN and the lack of agreement between 
NGOs – in line with the ideological fragmentation between European states – contributed to 
the futility of NGOs and IGOs’ efforts. Neutrality claims no longer provided moral authority, 
and saving ‘ourselves’ proved to be more important than saving the innocent. An interesting 
case study in this context is presented by Caestecker in this issue. He studies the reception of 
German communists in European countries, focussing on the role of the Red Help, a refugee 
aid organisation. Caestecker demonstrates that NGOs were at times able to counter some of the 
prevailing economic and political arguments used by states but not interminably because they 
possessed limited logistical or expert authority. The Red Help was most effective in lobbying 
for asylum of communist refugees when it became more accommodating to the authorities. 
 
[ILLUSTRATION 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE (PLACE NEXT TO EACH OTHER: Propaganda 
material from the World Council of Churches from 1950s emphasises the fact that refugee 
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migration is a world problem. Right top to bottom: Korean refugee shacks, Pusan; Church 
World Service sponsored refugees ready to sail for new homes in America; Children of 
unemployed refugees in a nissen camp, Kiel; Cave homes of Arab refugees in Jordan; Young 
refugees awaiting migration opportunities in Trieste camp. Left top to bottom: Refugees from 
China rest in their plane at Geneva, en route to church homes in Belgium; Resettled refugee by 
the WCC in Tripolis, Greece, this Rumanian refugee is now a successful candy maker; In a 
Berlin refugee centre a church counsellor teaches refugee youth. Source: Archive World 
Council of Churches, Geneva. 
 
 
Inclusion: late 1940s-1950s  
After the Second World War, states vowed to make sure that the newly formed United Nations 
would serve the world better than its predecessor, the LoN. The Charter of the United Nations, 
signed in 1945, insured, cemented and enhanced the role of NGOs. 
In post-war Western Europe, the housing shortage was the most pressing problem. It 
led to restrictive immigration regimes, and to the facilitation of large-scale emigration from 
Europe to Australia, Canada and the US. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of people 
‘returned’ from the colonies to Europe. In the immediate post-war period there were 14 million 
Displaced Persons (DPs) in Europe, plus 12 million expellees (ethnic Germans from countries 
that had been under Nazi rule and who were expelled to Germany after the war).65 The expellees 
were explicitly defined as non-DPs and non-refugees by the parties discussing an international 
solution to the DP or refugee problem. NGOs (such as Caritas), however, came out in support 
of the expellees, countering the revenge frame favoured by other claim makers, and thus gained 
moral authority.66 Although NGOs did try to find a common solution to the refugee problem, 
the very same NGOs clashed on other issues, for instance on what to do with Jewish orphans 
who had survived the war. Christian NGOs advocated for the rights of Christian foster parents, 
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and Jewish NGOs wanted the children to grow up in Jewish families or in Jewish orphanages.67 
These debates increased visibility for NGOs.  
During the war, the ILO created a Permanent Migration Committee, which studied the 
need for an international body that would organise the selection of (labour) migrants. The ILO 
however failed to take a leading role because a strict separation was made (and advocated for) 
between refugees and other migrants.68 The ILO, which had been active but largely ineffective 
in the interwar period, became increasingly dysfunctional in this period because it served too 
many (conflicting) goals in too many countries (increasingly also working in the recently 
decolonised countries).69  
The IRO (International Refugee Organization 1947-1950) took over the ILO’s role after 
the war, precisely because it managed to blur the lines between categories of migrants. It was 
said to function as the largest employment and travel agency in the world, which ‘sold’ DPs 
and refugees as workers. By re-labelling and allocating them with the category ‘labour 
migrants’, the IRO improved refugees’ chances of migration. The IRO appealed directly to 
authorities and campaigned via the press. The IRO was able to enforce European cooperation 
because it had money and shipping capacity. The relationship between the former allies 
deteriorated rapidly on the eve of the Cold War. As a result, between 1945 and 1951 several 
IGOs aiming at regulating international migration were established in rapid succession. The 
creation of a large number of organisations indicated both support for finding mutual solutions, 
as well as extreme fragmentation, competition and disagreement between NGOs and IGOs, and 
between states. IGO activity stimulated rather than pushed out NGO activity. New NGOs and 
NGO coordinating groups were created in response, such as the WCC (World Council of 
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Churches est. 1948) and ICMC (International Catholic Migration Commission est. 1951). 
ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 1952-1980) was able to regulate 
migration with the benefits of multilateral cooperation. It inherited the organisational 
infrastructure and the shipping fleet of the IRO.70 
Parsanoglou and Papadopoules, in this issue, describe the workings of the ICEM in the 
first 10 years after its establishment in 1952 as ‘part of the US propaganda mechanism during 
the Cold War.’ They elaborate on the cooperation of the ICEM with other international 
organisations, states and NGOs. It showed how multiple tasks and activities were outsourced 
to NGOs. They show how NGOs created the possibility to disseminate information to migrants 
(expert authority), to process and document migrants (logistical authority) and to promote 
additional resettlement (moral authority). We thus see that these concepts of authority moved 
in reciprocal directions. NGOs did not only use these concepts to influence others, but they 
were also used by ICEM to establish their expert, logistical and expert authority. 
Awareness that the failure of Evian had sealed the fate of Germans Jews, growing 
tensions relating to the Cold War, and the rejuvenation of inter-war ideas about refugee rights 
led to the establishment of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Most of the work behind the draft 
convention came from IRO staff members, who had personal experience of asylum and who 
were previously involved in pro-refugee NGOs. Twenty-five governments and the head of the 
newly formed UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, est. 1950) attended 
the conference of plenipotentiaries that took place in July 1951 to sign the Refugee Convention. 
Twenty-one NGOs were given observer status but their impact on the convention was officially 
muted.71 Yet, as Ben-Nun showed, Jewish NGOs helped to develop significant sections of the 
convention through their personal contacts and networks rather than through more formal, 
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visible routes.72 The UNHCR began life as a financially and politically weak organisation, 
mainly because the US refused to contribute to an organisation that functioned outside of its 
control. The UNHCR, in collaboration with the WCC, War Relief Services, the American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Lutheran World Federation, appealed to the Ford 
Foundation, which in response gave $3.1 million.73 The effectiveness of UNHCR’s work with 
refugees from East Germany in 1953 and the political expediency that states gained from 
welcoming communist defectors meant substantial state funding to UNHCR followed.74 NGO 
efforts and the political situation led to the expansion of UNHCR in this period. 
Since people were largely unable to cross the Iron Curtain, the numbers of refugees 
dwindled until the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. The number of people fleeing Hungary in 1956 
was not large (225,000) and public support for these refugees, who were perceived to prove 
capitalism right and communism wrong, was enormous. Large media campaigns created a 
willingness to donate money to NGOs. The 1956 Hungarian refugee crisis saw UNHCR named 
as the lead agency to coordinate assistance. The US took a large number of the Hungarian 
refugees.75 Economic growth and an increasing demand for labour in Western Europe also 
made accepting refugee migrants an acceptable option.76  
Overall, this was a period of expansion and inclusion, in which the number of IGOs and 
NGOs and their cooperation and interdependence grew. The logistical and expert authority of 
NGOs benefited IGOs such as UNHCR. On the one hand, the growth of the number of IGOs 
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helped NGOs because they could act as (usually) sympathetic agents with direct access to states. 
On the other hand, this development meant that NGOs were no longer the only or main aid 
providers and IGOs could be competitors. The growth of UNHCR, for example, resulted in a 
decrease of logistical authority for NGOs, as IGOs slowly became powerful actors in their own 
rights, in marked contrast to the inter-war period.  
 
Expansion: 1960s-1980s 
Until the early 1970s, West-European economies grew, and guestworker migrants were 
attracted to remedy labour market shortages. Some migrants could have asked for refugee 
status, but migration within the guestworker migration regime was simpler. After 1975, the 
possibilities for labour migration declined, and family migration and refugee migration 
consequently increased. In the 1960s and 1970s, attention for refugees outside Europe became 
more important. European NGOs gained high visibility with their campaigns for Chinese 
refugees, who fled to Hong Kong at a rate of 2,000 per day in 1962, for refugees from Biafra 
(Nigeria) in 1969, and for the millions of refugees from Eastern Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971. 
The number of international NGOs and IGOs involved in migration issues began to expand, 
particularly in Europe. Figures from the Union of International Associations’ online database 
show that the number of NGOs working with refugees almost doubled from 1966 to 1981 (see 







Based on Union of International Associations online database, 2009. 
 
The British lawyer Peter Benenson founded Amnesty International in 1961. Ten years later, a 
group of French doctors founded Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) after experiencing at first-
hand the suffering in Biafra. The Biafran humanitarian crisis made older NGOs, such as Oxfam 
(est. 1942), Save the Children, and Caritas more visible. The wars in Vietnam and Biafra, and 
the Portuguese colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea (1961-1974) 
were the first major televised wars. A large audience was exposed to horrifying images on a 
daily basis: starving children, endless numbers of victims, and soldiers who were no longer 
heroes. Conflicts led to large-scale internal and international displacements, and increases in 
the number of refugees. European NGOs reacted by acting more global. Teams of European 
workers and newly hired local staff combined in attempts to alleviate suffering. It is debatable 
how effective European NGOs were. Indeed the growing involvement of European NGOs in 
recently decolonised states led some scholars to suggest that the globalisation of NGOs 
represented a new form of colonialism.77  
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Student protests across Western Europe in 1968, the peace marches against American 
involvement in Vietnam, America’s foreign policy in South America, the assassination of 
Chile’s leader Salvador Allende (1973), and the Watergate scandal (1974) created resistance 
towards the traditional political system. NGOs in Europe appealed for support for Chilean and 
Vietnamese refugees. It led to the Geneva Conference on 20-21 July 1979 on Vietnamese 
boatpeople, which sought a solution at an international level. NGOs, in response to anti-political 
sentiment, explicitly moved attention in their campaigns away from political causes. Instead, 
they increasingly became mediators.78 Part of the NGOs also started to work together more. 
From the 1980s onwards, NGOs formed conglomerates in their bids for money, and as a way 
of consolidating their influence and power. The end of the Cold War opened up new political 
space for NGOs, which was further increased by changes in communications. Networking 
between organisations ensured increased power. By the 1980s, NGOs had firmly established 
themselves as the essence of civil society in the West.79  
The economic recession of the 1980s led to restrictive immigration regimes and the 
illegalisation of migration into Western Europe. State authorities left it to NGOs to solve the 
problems of migrants without legal residence status. Development NGOs started to advocate 
strongly in favour of helping the countries of origin of migrants in order to reduce migration. It 
was a policy that was supported by IGOs such as the IOM (International Organization for 
Migration est. 1989) and ILO.80 European NGOs became prominent actors throughout the 
world during this period.  
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Europeanisation in Post-Cold War Europe: 1990s to present 
The UN had granted consultative status to 41 NGOs in 1946. By 1992 more than 700 NGOs 
had attained consultative status and the number has increased to over 5,000 today.81 This rise 
mirrored developments in the politics of asylum, as NGOs advocating for the rights of refugees 
and asylum seekers grew enormously: the UNHCR listed 39 NGOs working for refugees in 
1950, while the OECD reported 1,300 such NGOs by the early 1990s.82 
The end of the Cold War resulted in more opportunities and tasks for IGOs. IOM 
became very active in Central and Eastern Europe, and a much stronger party in migration 
governance than its predecessors had ever been. It sought to manage migration by educating 
government officials and others in the countries of origin or transit of migrants. This form of 
education was combined with economic, political, financial, and military inducements.83 In the 
1990s, also the ILO also sought stronger cooperation with NGOs. 
The outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia in 1991 led to new refugee migration in 
Europe. By August 1992, approximately 2.5 million people had fled their homes as fighting in 
the Balkans spread. Almost 2 million were displaced within former Yugoslavia and 633,938 
sought asylum in Western European countries by 1994, the majority were Muslims from 
Bosnia.84 NGOs were able to mobilise support from organisations, which had originally catered 
to the needs of the Yugoslav guestworkers (of which there were about 600,000 in Germany). 
EU Member States’ attempts to restrict immigration, from the economic recession of 
the 1980s onwards, required a certain sophistication because of their duty to respect the 
European Convention on Human Rights, enforced by the European Court of Human Rights 
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(ECtHR) and, to a lesser extent, the European Court of Justice. In 1983, amended rules for the 
ECtHR allowed individuals to take cases before the court. The bestowal of rights on ‘persons’ 
rather than ‘citizens’ allowed it to hear cases concerning Europeans and non-Europeans alike.85 
The European Convention’s legal superiority over domestic legislation has meant that it serves 
as a bill of rights for certain countries without liberal constitutions. ‘Going to Strasbourg’ 
became a strategy NGOs deployed increasingly in the 1990s and especially the 2000s.86 The 
ECtHR’s case law became ‘the backbone of EU law on asylum’ and the court has played ‘a 
decisive role in protecting the fundamental rights of aliens facing expulsion’.87 Significantly, 
the ECtHR repeatedly calls international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty and Human 
Rights Watch, as well as the UNHCR, as expert witnesses.88 These types of human rights 
monitoring bodies are becoming more powerful because they have ‘developed a sound body of 
case-law on the rights of non-nationals in relation to the entry and stay, as well as non-removal 
from their countries of asylum’ which has increased their expert and moral authority 
extensively.89 
Following the completion of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Council 
meeting at Tampere in 1999 signalled the beginning of the increasing Europeanisation of 
asylum and migration.90 This led to the establishment of European bases for many international 
NGOs so that they could influence and engage with decision makers in Brussels. The 
development of the European Asylum Support Office soon afterwards presented NGOs with 
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several difficulties because it was not always clear who they needed to lobby as national 
delegates, Eurocrats, embassy staff and national civil servants all contributed to the 
development of various European directives associated with asylum, as demonstrated by Strik 
in this issue. Strik shows that although NGOs possessed expert and logistical authority, they 
found it extremely difficult to influence important policy decisions in the early 2000s because 
of the labyrinthine nature of EU policymaking.  
The civil war in Syria, which began in 2011, led to the displacement by 2018 of 6.6 
million people within Syria, while 5.6 million were registered as refugees by UNHCR in 
neighbouring countries. Over 3.6 million Syrian refugees reside in Turkey, approximately 1 
million in Lebanon, and over 650,000 in Jordan. 91 Between 2011 and 2017, over one million 
Syrians applied for asylum in the EU.92 IGOs (e.g. UNHCR, IOM) and NGOs (e.g. Caritas, 
MSF) are instrumental in the support and accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees in 
countries neighbouring Syria. All NGOs have developed extensive support campaigns, largely 
following strategies that were used in earlier campaigns. IGOs and NGOs became more critical 
of EU and Member State policies when the Member States became more dependent on their 
support. MSF for example refused EU funding to protest against EU deterrence policies.93 Yet, 
when state control returned, as occurred after the introduction of the EU-Turkey deal, states 
began to demote NGOs and IGOs.  
In recent decades, new EU Member States have become the special concern of NGOs 
fighting trafficking.94 The Czech Republic, for instance, is named as a transit and destination 
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country for women trafficked from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, China and Vietnam. NGOs offer packages – information which helps these 
states to bring their policies in line with EU guidelines, and strategies for how to address the 
media – to new Member States in order to fight trafficking, and by doing so these NGOs 
exercise influence on the how the policies in these countries are shaped.  
The ILO and IOM both developed new methods to estimate the extent of human 
trafficking.95 NGOs – such as La Strada (est. 1995), the Coalition Against Trafficking in 
Women (CATW), and the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW) – also 
provided estimates. The statistics they provide are widely used and give the organisations 
authority. In 2002, a European Conference on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings was organised under the framework of the European Commission’s STOP programme 
and took place in the European Parliament with the co-operation of the IOM, the European 
Commission, the Parliament and EU Member States. The conference brought together more 
than 1,000 representatives of European institutions, EU Member States, candidate countries, 
developing countries, IGOs and NGOs.96 The IOM and ILO became more important in 
migration governance because of their involvement in this domain.  
In the post-9/11 period, NGOs were increasingly called upon to combine migration and 
security issues. Both developments strengthened the role of NGOs and recognised their expert 
authority. Internal politics were important because large and established NGOs joined forces in 
order to consolidate their influence and IGOs sought the expertise and logistical authority of 
NGOs. Boundaries between categories of migrants blurred once again. The eastward expansion 
of the EU, the increasing Europeanisation of asylum and migration issues and the EU 
membership of new states with weak civil societies resulted in a larger playing field for NGOs. 
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Interestingly, while trade union and political party membership in Europe has declined, the 
number of NGOs has grown. This suggests that NGOs have partially filled this space. But 
Sending and Neumann note that this does not signify a simple neoliberal transfer of power from 
the state to non-state actors but rather that there has been ‘a changing logic or rationality of 
government’.97 This obviously has serious implications for NGOs, with Hilton warning that 
NGOs have consequently ‘become implicated within wider processes of the professionalization 
that lies at the heart of the modern state and which calls into question the claim of being “non-
governmental”’.98  
 
Explaining change  
Based on our overview presented above, we argue that five factors explain the changing role of 
NGOs: the position of states and their activities; geopolitical power relations and national 
politics; societal changes; internal politics; competition and cooperation between NGOs and 
with IGOs.  
In the first place, the loss of control by states (e.g. following the arrival of large numbers 
of refugees) impacts the role of NGOs. This is when states really need NGOs and IGOs to 
provide the expert and logistical authority that they are lacking. When state policies are 
challenged, ‘windows of opportunity’ are created for NGOs and IGOs.99 States ‘reconcile their 
normative beliefs’ to suit their new situations. Norm entrepreneurs, such as NGOs, enter 
debates on such occasions in an attempt to introduce new norms that favour migrant interests. 
When states re-attain control, they seek to roll back on the moral concessions they have 
provided in exchange for NGOs’ logistical and expert authority. 
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Second, changes in geo-political power relations and national politics (e.g. the 
beginning/end of the Cold War) affect the role of NGOs. The support of NGO goals from major 
political powers (e.g. the US or the EU) strengthens the role of NGOs. The sparring partners of 
NGOs are mostly nation states, and these to a large extent create the opportunity structures in 
which NGOs function. Neoliberalism also supports the view that state interests are best served 
by delegating tasks to NGOs. In this issue Gatrell pays particular attention to the role that states 
play in determining the success or failure of NGOs.  
Third, societal changes influence the role of NGOs.100 Christian organisations were 
important throughout the long twentieth century, but their position changed over time due to 
secularisation. Jewish NGOs (briefly) possessed influence in the late 1940s because of the 
horrors of the Holocaust. Societal change includes the consequences of technological 
developments (especially in communication and travel) and the changing possibilities for media 
campaigns. In order to capture and hold the media’s attention, NGOs must be innovative, while 
they also need to invest in maintaining networks and upholding reliability.  
Fourth, NGOs’ internal politics and strategies are important. NGOs can conduct highly 
visible, rapid, personalised and aggressive campaigns, which may have traction but will not 
give them a place at the negotiating table (outsider tactics).101 Or they can choose low-key 
campaigns which will make them part of the system they seek to ameliorate (insider tactics). A 
place at the table will lead to professionalisation and bureaucratisation, as well as a loss of 
spontaneity, which can reduce the influence of NGOs.102  
Lastly, large and established NGOs have vast knowledge and large networks that branch 
out into multiple domains and many countries. Authors have labelled the process in which 
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NGOs sponsor some local organisations, while dismissing or impeding the activities of others, 
as NGO-isation.103 NGO-isation has made it more difficult for new organisations to gain a 
foothold. It has also made it difficult for weak states to resist the influence of large NGOs. This 
crowding-out effect (organisations becoming expendable because of competing institutions) 
also explains the changing role of NGOs. NGOs dealing with migration issues compete with 
each other over money and volunteer input, but support for an alternative goal can also 
strengthen the NGOs’ migration activities (e.g. women’s rights, famine relief). The options 
open to NGOs depend on what IGOs and national or supranational institutions cannot or do not 
want to do. Over time NGOs became more intertwined with each other and with IGOs, and 
more similar as a result of imitation, developments under similar constraints, financial 
entanglement and formalised relations.104 And while this intertwining has in many cases 
strengthened the positions of NGOs, it has also blurred the lines between NGOs, and between 
NGOs and IGOs. Competition has increased because NGOs and IGOs became too similar. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we sought to explain the role of NGOs in European migration governance and 
when and why it changed. Over time, NGOs have branched out, diversified, and increasingly 
worked in multiple domains. Authorities have relied on NGOs for practical and societal support. 
NGOs had moral authority (derived from their campaigns against trafficking, for starving 
children, and from their claims towards neutrality); expert authority due to their legal 
knowledge and access to statistics; and logistical authority because they could move goods and 
mobilise people. The end of the Cold War meant that a new field of operations opened up and 
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NGOs that had been active in Western Europe became active in Eastern Europe. The lack of a 
strong civil society in Eastern Europe meant they could play a key role. Eventually IGOs and 
NGOs created a symbiosis. NGOs competed with each other and with IGOs. As IGOs’ power 
has increased, so too has that of NGOs. The blurring of lines between NGO and IGO work, 
representation and organisation, resulted in NGOs being further encapsulated within the 
government system. Some of the older NGOs became bigger and more involved, while some 
lost part of their influence because they were silenced. 
 The position of states and their activities, geopolitical power relations and national 
politics, societal changes, internal politics and competition and cooperation between NGOs and 
with IGOs all explain the changing role of NGOs in European migration governance. Based on 
our overview, we found that it is the competition and cooperation between NGOs and with 
IGOs that drives change. This relation between NGOs and with IGOs is something the literature 
has largely neglected. 
 
 
 
